The sorites paradox: remove one grain from a heap and it is still a heap. Repeat. At some point it is no longer a heap, but no single removal caused the transition. Classical logic demands that each removal either preserves heapness or destroys it, but no particular removal seems to do either. The paradox arises from applying binary truth values to a predicate that resists binary classification.
Tzouvaras (arXiv:2603.11624, 2026) dissolves the paradox by modeling the observer. Objects are represented as functions of time and observer — “fluxing objects” whose properties change across discrete observation moments. The observer does not watch continuously. Between observations, the object can change imperceptibly — each step is below the threshold of detection. The transition from heap to non-heap occurs not at any observed moment but in the gaps between observations, where the observer has no access.
The partiality of the observer's function — the fact that some moments are unobserved — creates truth-value gaps. These gaps are not failures of the logic but its third value. The result is strong Kleene three-valued logic, where the third value means “the property shifted during an observation gap.” True, false, and unobserved.
The structural point: the paradox presupposes continuous access to the object's properties. If the observer sees every grain removed, binary logic demands a sharp boundary and none exists. If the observer has gaps — as human perception necessarily does, constrained by attention and temporal resolution — the boundary can fall in a gap. The paradox is not in the object or the predicate. It is in the assumption that observation is complete. The logic that emerges from incomplete observation is three-valued, and the third value dissolves the contradiction by giving it a place to live.